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Exploring the theories, determinants and policy-options of street vending: a demand-
side approach
Abstract
Street vending has been a common feature of urban centres for several decades, with a 
relatively high proportion of developing countries’ populations depending on it for 
employment, income or survival. Taking a supply-side approach, studies have shown that 
urban planners’ responses to street vending have followed the modernism theory. In this 
paper, we take a demand-side (buyer-focused) approach to studying street vending, which to 
date has received little attention from the academic community. Employing data from Lagos 
state, Nigeria, we report four explanations underpinning the demand-side of street vending: 
formal economy failures, social/redistributive, financial gains, and multifeature. These are, in 
turn, explained by individuals’ marital status, level of education, and perception. Our findings 
highlight the need for urban planners to embrace pragmatic policies in addressing these 
demand-side drivers of street vending and use of urban space, rather than criminalising its 
actors.
Keywords
Street vending, hawkers, demand-side, emerging market, theories, determinants, policy
Page 1 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Introduction
Street vendors, a major sub-group within the informal economy1, are individuals or ‘small-
business entrepreneurs, generally own-account or self-employed’, who engage in 
manufacturing and/or street-trading of ‘legal or socially acceptable goods and services’, 
particularly in mobile forms, fixed or semi-fixed stalls, public/private spaces, whether 
regulated or otherwise; ‘thus [flouting] either business regulation, planning codes or other 
legal requirements.’ (Onodugo et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2010:667; Basinski, 2009; Cross, 
2000). They play important roles in the urban economy by manufacturing and/or selling 
essential and unique goods and services at relatively cheap prices and convenience to 
consumers (Martinez et al., 2017; Wongtada, 2014). In developing countries, street vending 
constitutes around three-quarters of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), provides 
employment, income or survival-means for a relatively high proportion of the urban 
population, it alleviates poverty, and offers flexibility and autonomy to those engaged in it 
(Onoduga et al., 2016; Maneepong and Walsh, 2013; Brown et al., 2010; Skinner, 2008:30; 
Cross, 2000). However, corresponding policies are ‘ambivalent’ (Xue and Huang 2015:156), 
ranging from support for street vendors, accommodation, through to the repression of street 
vendors. Specific to the latter, street vending has been criminalised in many cities, including 
Lagos, Nigeria, the subject of this study. Underpinning a repressive policy approach is the 
modernisation or urbanisation theory. Here, vendors are seen as a nuisance, disrupting urban 
1 The informal economy is defined as having ‘three elements: informal employment (those 
doing informal-type jobs, regardless of location/enterprise[-type]); employment in the 
informal economy (those working in informal sector enterprises, regardless of job-type); and 
all legal activities that contribute to GDP, but not captured by official statistics, for various 
reasons’ (Igudia et al., 2016:154). Informal employment is ‘divided into two types: informal 
waged employment and self-employment’ (Huang et al., 2017:3). Street vendors are a type of 
‘informal self-employment’ (ibid).
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planning and traffic, and carrying out criminal activities in the urban centre (Xue and Huang, 
2015; Crossa, 2008). Thus, accompanying policies focus mostly on deterrence, with harsh 
punishments for street vendors carrying out legitimate economic activities (Crossa, 2008; 
Cross, 2000). 
In recent years, however, crackdowns on vending have started to focus on patrons. For 
example, in 2016, the government of Lagos state, Nigeria started implementing a law that 
prosecutes both vendors and their patrons. To date, however, little is known about the 
motives for patronising street vendors, as few studies explore the motives for buying vended 
products – Culiberg and Bajde (2014) and Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014). Specific to 
Nigeria, no such study exists. We contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature by 
employing data collected from Lagos state, Nigeria to investigate, first, the motives for 
patronising street vendors; and, thereafter, respondents’ perceptions and socioeconomic-
demographic attributes relating to these motives.  
The study is underpinned by the assertion that vending thrives only when there are buyers of 
hawked goods/services. Thus, having full information about vendors’ patrons is as important 
as information on street vendors. In focusing on the former, this paper undertakes a critical 
analysis of the three main theories on buying from street vendors: financial gains (FG), social 
redistribution (SR), and formal economy failures (FEF). From this we derive our research 
questions: what factors influence the decisions of individuals to buy goods/services from 
street vendors rather than a formal shop? What are the characteristics of these patrons? What 
is the best policy option following the evidence from this study? To answer these questions, 
we set up seven hypotheses based on theory and test them in our specific context. 
Specifically, we employ data collected from 160 individuals in Lagos state, who have bought 
products from street vendors. Throughout this paper, the terms street ‘vendors’ and ‘hawkers’ 
or ‘hawking and vending’ are used interchangeably.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, we present the background to the 
study, then we review the literature analysing the demand-side of street vending. This is 
followed by methods, results and discussion, and conclusions. 
Background to the study
The literature is replete with theories explaining street vending and the informal economy 
(for example, see Huang et al., 2017; Skinner, 2008; Maloney, 2004; Cross, 2000; De Soto, 
1989; Hart, 1973)2. Most, however, focus on the supply-side. To avoid replicating these 
widely-discussed studies, we focus attention here on the modernism theory. This addresses 
the repression (or criminalisation) of street vending, hence is particularly relevant to our 
paper. In the next section, we move on to present a critical review of demand-side theories, 
this paper’s primary focus. 
In this paper, modernism (Scott, 1998) explains state/urban planners’ hostile response to 
street vending. Modernism argues that, in relation to vending, an investment-friendly urban 
centre with a good-looking image is prioritised; consequently, urban planners illegalise and 
crackdown on vending because vendors are seen as irritants who make the urban centre 
unattractive to investors (Onodugo et al., 2016; Bromley and Mackie, 2009; Crossa, 2008; 
Swanson, 2007). Cross (2000:30) sums it up this way, ‘Modernism often implied crackdowns 
on street vendors because of the ideals of public order and state control’.
2 The dualist, neo-marxist, legalist, voluntarist, modernisation, structuralist, excessive state 
regulations, neoliberal and postmodernism theories have been discussed extensively by these 
authors. 
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The modernism view underpins policy responses to street vending in many countries. Laws 
prohibiting street vending have been implemented in Lagos, Nigeria (Roever and Skinner, 
2016). Similar laws, violent evictions and harassment of vendors have been reported in 
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Hong Kong, Mexico City, and South Africa (Roever and Skinner, 2016; 
Tibaijuka, 2005; Cross, 2000). Specific to Lagos, the street trading and illegal market 
(prohibition) law (1984; 1996; 2003) prohibits and potentially criminalises street vending. 
Beyond confiscating vendors’ wares, the Law specifies a jail term of between six and twelve 
months or a fine of between ninety thousand Naira [US$671.89]3 and one hundred and eighty 
thousand Naira [US$1,343.78] for offenders. Street venders typically do not have money to 
pay these fines, thus spending up to 12 months in jail becomes the de facto penalty for 
vending on Lagos streets. 
Further, the same law potentially criminalises buying from street vendors. Offenders are fined 
ninety thousand Naira and/or sent to prison for six months. The Lagos state government’s 
justification for implementing these laws is based on the modernism argument: clearing 
environmental nuisance, security threats to citizens, and projecting a good-looking image of 
the state (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Xue and Huang, 2015; AFP, 2016). Clearly, in the 
policy makers’ view, street vending is unwanted in the Lagos ultra-modern, megacity project 
(Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Basinski, 2009), because, as nuisance, it distorts the urban 
centre and violates land use acts, state laws, and labour regulations (Adedeji et al., 2014; 
Wongtada, 2013; Cross, 2000). Consequently, street vending must be stopped/banned. 
Enforcing a ban on street vending has, however, led to violent evictions of, and assaults on, 
vendors in Lagos. Even so, there are doubts about the success of such policies. Specifically, 
3 Using average of 2003 daily Naira-US Dollar exchange rate: US$1.00 to NGN133.95 
(obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria website)
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readings in Cross (2000), Basinski (2009) and Crossa (2016) show that policies promoting 
violent evictions of street vendors are often unsuccessful. This creates a situation that can 
best be described as a hide and seek game. Street vendors continue to operate, but cautiously, 
to avoid detection by law enforcement officers (sell when the latter are out of sight but 
run/hide when visible). We were told during fieldwork that street vendors now give ‘signals’ 
or make telephone calls to each other to avoid capture by law enforcement officers. Thus, 
despite the ban, street vending has not stopped in Lagos (Basinski, 2009). We may find 
explanations in historical, supply, demand and socioeconomic factors. These (except demand, 
discussed in a later section) are discussed next, after we present some facts about Lagos.
With a population of around 15 million people, Lagos state is the largest commercial centre 
in Nigeria and one of the fastest growing cities in the world (Basinski, 2009). Nigeria is the 
most populous country in Africa with over 185 million people, a 2016 urban-population 
growth rate of 4.3 per cent, and arguably Africa’s largest economy with 2014 current GDP of 
US$568.50 billion (World Bank, 2018). Lagos contributes 32 per cent and 65 per cent to 
Nigeria’s GDP and VAT receipts, respectively. Contributing to Lagos is a significant 
informal economy, which provides employment for about 70 per cent of Nigerians, and 
‘street vendors are the most visible manifestation’ of this (Basinski, 2009:3). 
As for the factors responsible for its importance, historically, street vending in Lagos has 
been influenced by multiple factors: migration, fluctuating income levels, heavy vehicular 
traffic-congestion (which is responsible for a loss of three hours travelling time daily and 
which has entrenched a culture of commuting-shopping), and inadequate urban planning – all 
of which have become synonymous with a densely populated Lagos (AFP, 2016; Basinski, 
2009; Gandy, 2006). As Nigeria’s former capital city, Lagos attracts domestic and foreign 
migrants, but with limited formal-sector jobs available, these immigrants often turn to 
vending to survive (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Basinski, 2009). Also important are 
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Nigeria’s economic crises of the 1980s, the resulting structural adjustment programme (SAP) 
which pushed many into the informal economy, with national policy makers’ hoping to 
stimulate Nigeria’s growth through the informal economy (Igudia et al., 2016; Meagher and 
Yenusa, 1996). However, the three tiers of government tend to pursue different, even 
conflicting, agendas. While local authorities grant/sell operating-rights to street vendors, the 
State government, through law enforcement officers, repress and arrest vendors, confiscating 
their wares (Basinski, 2009). The federal government, meanwhile, views the informal 
economy as a potential catalyst for economic growth.
On the supply-side, factors such as migration, limited formal sector job-opportunities, and a 
high population growth rate are responsible for the growing size of street vending in Lagos 
(Hyde, 2018; Igudia et al., 2016). Additionally, the government’s inconsistent modernisation 
policies have led to the repeated demolition of existing markets with former owners, priced 
out of the new stores/markets, turning to street vending (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; The 
Guardian, 2016). As such, Lagos’ street vendors, whilst heterogeneous in terms of age, 
gender, marital status, educational attainment, and product-offerings, share a common 
denominator in that they engage in street vending because there is no alternative (Hyde, 
2018; AFP, 2016; Basinski, 2009). Thus, people with(out) formal education, adequate 
skills/training, unable to find formal-sector jobs or secure a permanent shop location, are left 
with the option of vending (selling food, non-food, drinks, groceries, mobile phones/data, 
books, hard-/soft-ware, shoe-shine services, etc) for subsistence returns, to pay rent and their, 
or their childrens’, school fees (The Guardian, 2016; AFP, 2016; Basinski, 2009). 
Finally, socioeconomic and demographic factors influence participation in the informal 
economy, with diverse results reported in the literature. A relatively higher proportion of 
women, individuals with a low level of education, low skills, low wages/income, and a high 
level of poverty, operate in the informal economy (Verick, 2006; Becker, 2004; Schneider et 
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al., 2001; ILO, 1972). Specifically, more women than men participate on the demand-side 
(Sookram and Watson, 2008); buying from street vendors in the search for lower prices 
(Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). Conversely, some studies find that higher education 
attainment and higher wages/income lead to higher participation in the informal economy (for 
example, see Sookram and Watson, 2008). Although, Sookram and Watson reported these 
results without offering any explanation, the tax and informal economy literature has shown 
that fiscal knowledge acquired from higher levels of education leads to tax avoidance or 
evasion, hence increased participation in informality (Helhel and Ahmed, 2014). The 
literature is also inconclusive on participants’ age (Sookram and Watson, 2008), although 
Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014) find that younger and older people buying from vendors 
are motivated by lower prices and formal economy failures, respectively. Marital status 
influences demand-side participation (Schneider et al., 2001), but cohabiting or divorced 
people with children buy from street vendors for their lower prices (Williams and Martinez-
Perez, 2014). Specific to Lagos, Basinski (2009) show that street vendors are typically aged 
between twelve and sixty-six, are at least secondary school graduates, largely women, 
married with children, self-employed, work long hours, but earn different levels of wages.
These mixed results demonstrate that multiple factors explain street vending participation. 
Laws prohibiting and criminalising it are short-term, sub-optimal fixes, which leave root-
causes unaddressed. There is thus an urgent need for more studies in this area, especially on 
the demand side which has thus far received little attention to determine the full nature of 
those root causes.
Explaining street vending – a demand-side approach
Studies on the demand-side of street vending are few, but Williams and Martinez-Perez 
(2014) and Culiberg and Bajde (2014) are among the exceptions. Our paper builds on both 
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studies. We explore, apply and extend the three demand-side theories defined by Williams 
and Martinez-Perez (2014): the financial gains (FG), social/redistributive (SR), and formal 
economy failures (FEF) explanations. Also, we adapt ‘perception’ from Culiberg and Bajde 
(2014) and explore its role in furthering our understanding of these theories. Whereas 
Culiberg and Bajde studied individuals’ personal moral and perception about consumption 
tax evasion, we take a broader look by exploring the links between motives and perception. 
Specifically, following Sookram and Watson (2008) and William and Martinex-Perez (2014) 
we employ theories, perception and (socio)economic variables to investigate the demand-side 
of street vending. 
The FG explanation covers buying from vendors on rational grounds. Beyond the low-
income population (Martinez et al., 2017) and the rich in poor neighbourhoods (Cross, 2000), 
FG theory argues that individuals patronise street vendors because of anticipated/calculated 
financial gains. They carry out a cost-benefit or ‘risk-reward’ analysis of their options, then 
break ‘the law[, patronise vendors] when the expected penalty and probability of detection 
are smaller than the profits’ (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014:803; Sookram and Watson, 
2008). This plausibly explains the resilience of street vending in Lagos, despite laws 
criminalising it. Basinski (2009) shows that Lagos vendors are ready to take risks, vend and 
face the consequences, since they have no alternative source of livelihood. Conversely, 
people with dependent children buy from vendors to save money (Williams and Martinez-
Perez, 2014). Further, following Martinez et al. (2017), it appears that people patronise 
vendors in Lagos because they are poor and earn a low-income4. With 87 million Nigerians 
(44.3% of Nigeria’s population) living in extreme poverty, weak GDP growth (0.8% in 
2017), rising unemployment (highest among youths and graduates), and wages of less than 
4 Meagher and Yunusa’s, 1996, note that working-class income affects the demand-side of 
the Nigerian informal economy.
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two dollars a day for those in employment (NGN18,000 or US$59, monthly-minimum wage)5 
(WPC, 2018; Kharas et al., 2018), buying cheaper products from street vendors offers most 
Nigerians an opportunity to save.  
Hypothesis (H1). The financial gain motive drives individuals to buy products from street 
vendors
For its part, the SR rationale follows a post-structuralist perspective of the informal economy. 
It argues that individuals purchase goods/services from street vendors to build or enhance 
social relations and ties such as kin, pursue social and redistributive purposes (Round and 
Williams, 2008), resist anti-social practices (e.g., corruption) and the exploitation of workers 
in the neo-liberal economic system (Biles, 2009; Whitson, 2007), or support environments 
where individuals can transform work identity or discover their true selves (Williams and 
Nadin, 2010). Here, ‘participants in informal markets [are seen] as social actors [and not] 
economic actors’ (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014:803). For example, during fieldwork 
some participants told us they patronise street vendors out of ‘pity’; to ‘help or support’ them. 
SR is better understood when Nigerian peoples’ culture of close family kinship is considered. 
A popular mantra is ‘be your brother’s keeper’; literally interpreted, care for others. Buying 
products from kin operating as vendors can be a way of showing commitment to kinship, 
even beyond family to include members of the same religion, business associates, and 
friends. 
Hypothesis (H2). Social/redistributive motives drive individuals to patronise street vendors
According to the FEF explanation, individuals patronise street vendors because of the 
‘failures of the formal economy’ including delays in the provision, ‘lack of availability and 
5 Using CBN published exchange rate (NGN305.00:US$1.00) as@20/08/2018
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reliability’, and the ‘quality’, of formal firms’ goods/services (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 
2014:803; see also Biles, 2009; Maloney, 2004; De Soto, 1989). Typically, vendors make it 
possible for individuals to have easy and quick access to goods/services, irrespective of 
location and time. Specific to Lagos, FEF arises from inadequate urban planning and 
infrastructural development, high population density and regular traffic congestion (Basinski, 
2009; Gandy, 2006). Commuters have responded to these failures by shopping in traffic 
which, unlike supermarkets, is available, accessible and convenient (Hyde, 2018; Hanafi, 
2018; Basinski, 2009). Thus, unlike commuters shopping online in advanced countries, 
commuters in Lagos do their shopping from street vendors. Further, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in Nigeria’s telecommunications industry (e.g., MTN) and food and beverages 
industry (e.g., UAC foods) have modelled their business around vending, as their products 
are mostly sold on the street (The Guardian, 2016; Neuwirth, 2011).
Hypothesis (H3). The unavailability of products in the formal market, and/or the informal 
economy’s faster or better-quality service, drives individuals to buy from street vendors.
In a study of the determinants of the informal economy, Sookram and Watson (2008) report 
the strong influence of perception. Similarly, in applying and extending ‘Jones’s issue 
contingent model’, Culiberg and Bajde (2014) report the strong influence of ‘moral 
philosophy and perception’, and that perception influences moral judgement and intentions. 
Trivedi et al., (2003) observe that individuals’ moral reasoning, value orientation, and social 
and political environments influence their perceptions. We accept these narratives and argue 
that respondents have formed perceptions based on their moral reasoning, orientation and 
experiences regarding Lagos street vendors/vending and government policy. This justifies our 
decision to investigate how their perception relates to their motives for patronising vendors. 
Hypothesis (H4-7): The stronger the perception that:
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H4: ‘hawkers are poor, disadvantaged’, the higher is the incentive to patronise on SR grounds
H4b. ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’, the higher is the incentive to patronise street vendors
H5. ‘hawkers pay no tax’, the higher the incentive to patronise them on FG grounds.  
H6. ‘hawkers pay multiple fees’, the higher the incentive to patronise them on FEF/SR 
grounds
H7. ‘Government overregulates, disturbs hawkers’, the stronger the incentive to patronise 
street vendors
Methods 
We employ data collected in a two-stage process between May and August 2017 from 
vendors’ patrons in Lagos, Nigeria. In addition to gaining empirical support (Reddy et al., 
2003; William and Round, 2009; Arimah, 2011), our sampling methods are the best, 
practicable option for this study. First, it ensures the data collected cover a wide range of 
geographical areas and are representative of the true population, considering the huge cost 
and time required to cover the entire population. Secondly, considering the spate of 
kidnappings in Nigeria at the time, it was a realistic and practical way of gaining respondents’ 
trust in collecting the required information. Thirdly, avoiding a house-to-house survey gave 
respondents additional comfort and reduced any suspicion that they could be traceable (also 
see footnotes 7, 11).
In stage one, we employed a ‘street-by-street survey’ (Reddy et al., 2003:137), with a spatial 
random sampling method (Williams and Round, 2009). The former involves administering a 
survey instrument to members of the public who cooperate, whilst the latter involves 
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selecting every alternate location and participant for sampling (see Igudia et al., 2016). Thus, 
we went to business premises/workshops, public places, and bus terminals to select every 
alternate adult that was willing to complete our questionnaire, and where an individual 
declines, the next person is sampled and the one after is skipped. We listed in alphabetical 
order the ‘ten (10) most well-established street vending locations in Lagos state’ (Anetor, 
2015:36)6. Then, we selected randomly for the survey, the following five, starting with the 
second, then every alternate location: Ajah, Iyana-Ipaya, Mile2, Orile and Yaba. We 
administered 120 questionnaires at each location, generating 600 completed responses. 
However, not all were usable. 
In Stage two, we employed other criteria to select from the 600 responses. This involved a 
purposeful selection, where only participants that answered yes to the question ‘have you 
ever bought a good or service from a street hawker’ were selected (Williams and Martinez-
Perez, 2014 employed a similar question in their study). This yielded a total of 160 (out of 
600) relevant responses, employed in this study. The extra step was taken to ensure the 
information used in the study is from respondents who have bought from street vendors, in 
line with the aim of this study.
To help administer the questionnaire, three indigenous assistants, who recently completed 
their secondary school education and who spoke the native Yoruba language, were recruited 
and trained. Training the administrators to avoid leading answers was part of our efforts to 
reduce interviewer bias. To check their understanding of the process, they administered an 
early version of the questionnaire to thirty people. Feedback from the pilot study influenced 
the design of the final questionnaire. For example, we changed some words in the survey 
6 These are Agege, Ajah, Berger, Iyana-Ipaja, Maryland, Mile2, Obalende, Orile, Oshodi, and 
Yaba
Page 13 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
instrument: ‘vendor/(ing)’ to ‘hawker/(ing)’. Further, employing administrators improved the 
quality and quantity of data we were able to gather, as the assistants helped to debunk 
suspicion about the survey7. 
We collected information on respondents’ age, gender, education, marital status, income, 
employments/business-enterprises, participation in street vending, perception, and reasons for 
buying from street vendors (but no question on why they sell; this has been addressed in the 
literature). To ensure response consistency and mitigate problems associated with surveying 
the informal economy, some questions were repeated, but worded differently. To reduce 
biases associated with collected opinions, both open- and closed-ended questions were 
employed (see Huang, et al., 2017; Iyenda, 2005)8. For example, we asked ‘why did you 
patronise street hawkers?’ without offering any suggestion of possible reasons9. Interestingly, 
responses to this question extend the literature, because cited motives for patronising street 
vendors in Nigeria were not only consistent with literature-defined theories (FEF, FG and 
SR), but also a new, fourth explanation emerged. We term this the multifeature motive.10
7 Some respondents were suspicious of the purpose of the survey, as they thought that the 
Lagos state government commissioned it to get information on street vendors and patrons.
8 Reja et al., 2003 & Geer, 1991, note that open-ended questions generate genuine concerns, 
spontaneous and unbiased responses, and reduce biases arising from researchers’ suggestions.
9 Bias may arise from coding and analysing responses to open-ended questions. To reduce 
this bias we, first, noted all the different words used by respondents, then we grouped the 
words into similar themes. For the question above, seventeen different words were used, but 
many of the words mean the same thing: (e.g., ‘save time’, ‘quick’, ‘fast’); (‘reduce cost’, 
‘cheaper than shop’, ‘save money’). Through thematic analysis, we were able to give the 
same code to words/sentences expressing the same meaning. (See Table 3).
10 We show in the discussion of Table 3, especially the last paragraph the justification for 
introducing multifeature as a stand-alone motive.
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Finally, we employ multinomial logistic regression to determine the attributes of these four 
explanations. Multinomial logistic regression is appropriate for analysing data employed in 
this study; specifically, a nominal dependent variable, with multiple categorical and ordinal 
explanatory variables (Williams and Martinez, 2014; Sookram and Watson, 2008). The key 
question we seek to answer is, what factors, attributes or characteristics relate to motives for 
buying from street vendors? Our hypotheses, formulated to answer the question, are based on 
existing theory and literature: H1-H3 follow Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014); H4-H7 
follow Sookram and Watson (2008) and the evidence from the wider literature on factors 
influencing vending patronage. Finally, we test for internal consistency, reliability of 
variables survey instrument and achieve an acceptable Cronbach alpha coefficient of over 0.7 
(Table 1).
Results and Analysis
Cronbach’s reliability test results are presented in Table 1 (for full-detailed results, see 
extended appendix). Following Field’s (2005) suggestions, a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 or more 
(as reported here: 0.712 and 0.858) is acceptable. We are therefore confident that the 
variables used in this study are consistent and reliable.  
[Insert Table 1 here]
We present in Table 2, respondents’ demographics and some important descriptive statistics. 
With 51.2 per cent and 48.8 per cent for men and women respectively, both genders are 
reasonably represented in this study. Although the highest proportion of participants is age 
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26-30, respondents were drawn across all ages of the active labour force in Nigeria. 
Participants are relatively educated, with the highest proportion (40.6%) having secondary 
school education (SSE), although 12.5 per cent of participants have no formal education at 
all.
[Insert Table 2 here]
About half (49.4%) of respondents are self-employed. The rest either own/run a business 
alongside their main employment (13.2%) or in full-time employment (18.1%). The highest 
proportion (41.3%) of respondents carry out home services (gateman, laundry, plumber, 
electrician) or pure services (mechanic, hair dressing, tailoring, repairs). Next is the 
proportion of respondents who trade (36.4%). Comparing genders, the highest proportion 
(33.3%) of female respondents engage in petty/kiosk trade, followed by home/pure service 
(29.5%), then professionals (19.5%). For male participants, the highest proportion (43.9%) 
provides home/pure services, followed by trade (31.7%), then professionals (20.7%). Further, 
about three quarters of respondents whose main jobs/businesses are home/pure services 
provision (74.1%) and sales/trading (76.9%), have been involved in the supply-side of 
hawking, in contrast with a third of professionals (34.4%) who have been involved as 
vendors.  
Reasons for patronising street hawkers in Nigeria – a demand-side approach
Responses to the following open-ended question are depicted in Table 3: Why did you 
patronise street hawkers? (This gains empirical support from Huang et al., 2017). With just 
over half (53.3%) of respondents patronising street vendors because they provide accessible, 
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fast and reliable goods/services, the FEF explanation is clearly the strongest rationale for 
patronising street vendors in Lagos, Nigeria. This is followed by the FG rationale, with just 
above one-tenth (12.5%) of respondents; split between ‘cheaper than their cost in shop’ 
(10.5%) and ‘save on expenses, reduce cost’ (2%). Finally, with around one-tenth (9.8%) of 
respondents (split between ‘networking’ (2.6%) and ‘help hawkers’ (7.2%)), the SR rationale 
is confirmed as the third main motive for patronising vendors in Lagos. These results confirm 
hypotheses 1-3. 
[Insert Table 3 here]
However, a unique, fourth motive for patronising street vendors emerged from the results. 
We call it the multifeature motive, with 24.3 per cent of respondents patronising vendors ‘to 
make easy income or sales’ (13.8%) and ‘to reduce stress, survive or do the only job known’ 
(10.5%) (Table 3). With the multifeature motive, respondents patronise street vendors for two 
reasons: to buy and to sell. They buy from street vendors to build a network of customers, 
which they in turn ‘make quick sales [to, in order to] reduce stress and survive in the only 
job/business I know’ (respondents’ words). Further, multifeature leverages on the three main 
motives to build its unique identity: individuals want FG because patronising street vendors 
provide them with the platform to get quick and reliable money/income; they build a network 
of people (SR), who in turn become a stream of customers to whom they make quick sales; 
and they patronise street vendors because there are FEF, which they want to avoid, as this 
‘creates lot of stress’ (respondents’ words) for them. Thus, multifeature-participants reduce 
the survival-related stress created by FEF, by participating in both the supply- and the 
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demand-side of vending. Further, multifeature-participants suggest that the informal 
economy/street vending is self-sustaining.
Finally, the multifeature rationale is different from the three-main explanations (FEF, FG, 
and SR) because of the core-intentions of individuals in this category: ultimately to sell, 
having started by buying from existing vendors. As depicted in Table 3, the words used by 
respondents categorised as multifeature relate to the supply-side, whilst words describing the 
three-main theories relate to the demand-side, of street vending. For example, FEF 
respondents use such words as ‘accessible’, reliable’, ‘save time’, whilst such words as ‘quick 
money’, ’reliable money’, ’easy sales’ were used for multifeature. Similarly, FG involves 
words such as ‘cheaper’, ’better than shop’, ’save expenses’, ’less costly’, whilst multifeature 
uses ‘reduce stress’, ‘survival’, ‘only job known’.
Attributes explaining the demand-side theories of street vending 
The results in Table 4 show that four perception and two demographic/socioeconomic 
variables are statistically important. Two perception variables, ‘hawkers are 
poor/disadvantaged’ and ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’, measure perceptions of street 
vendors/vending, whilst the other two, ‘hawkers pay multiple fees’ and ‘hawkers pay no tax’, 
measure perceptions of urban policy and tax respectively. Marital status and education level 
are the relevant demographic/socioeconomic variables, implying gender and age are 
statistically non-significant11. So too is the variable ‘government overregulates, disturbs 
11 Income is excluded from this study, as responses to the income question appear inaccurate 
and inconsistent. Although, not without precedent (Arima, 2011, observed research 
participants often do not give accurate answers to questions relating to their income), at the 
time we conducted the fieldwork, the spate of kidnappings in Nigeria was at an all-time high. 
Hence, there was a general lack of trust, which limited the quantity and quality of income-
related information we were able to gather.
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hawkers’, implying that regulatory burden, a key determinant of supply-side and dual (supply 
and demand) participation in the street vending/informal economy (Sookram and Watson, 
2008; Maloney, 2004; De Soto, 1989) is not a relevant determinant of demand-side 
participation. This is consistent with the findings of Sookram and Watson (2008:1541) that 
‘excessive government regulation’ does not ‘encourage participation’ on the demand-side of 
the informal economy, but it does encourage ‘dual participation’. 
[Insert Table 4 here]
With both the Likelihood ratio (75.8) and Chi-square (114.49) significant at the 1 per cent 
level, and a Pseudo-R2 of 0.80, these six variables capture 80 per cent of the factors 
explaining respondents’ motives for patronising street vendors in Nigeria. The sign of an 
attribute demonstrates how it explains a theory/motive, relative to the referenced 
theory/motive. Where positive (negative), the compared theory is more (less) likely than the 
referenced theory to be plausible. Next, we undertake a detailed presentation of results in 
Table 4. 
Formal economy failures (FEF): relative to singles, married people are less likely to buy 
products from vendors for FEF than the FG motive. Compared to those with a degree, 
individuals with the lowest levels of educational attainment (SSE and below) are less likely to 
buy from vendors for FEF than the FG motive. Individuals who disagreed with the statements 
‘hawkers are poor and disadvantaged’ and ‘hawkers pay multiple fees’ are more likely to buy 
from vendors for FEF than the multifeature motive. Conversely, individuals who disagreed 
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with the statement, ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’ are less likely to buy from street vendors 
for FEF than the multifeature motive.
Social redistributive rationale (SR): individuals with an intermediate level of education 
(above SSE but below BSc/degree) are less likely to buy products from street vendors for 
multifeature rather than SR reasons. Also, individuals who disagreed with the statement, 
‘hawkers pay no tax’ are less likely to buy from vendors for SR than the FG motive. 
Financial gains explanation (FG): relative to singles, married people are more likely to buy 
products from street vendors for FG than multifeature and FEF motives. Relative to 
BSc/degree, individuals with the lowest levels of educational attainment (SSE and below) 
and intermediate-level educational attainment are respectively less likely to buy from vendors 
for FEF and multifeature motives than the FG motive. Individuals who disagreed with the 
statement ‘hawking is helpful to street hawkers’ are less likely to patronise vendors for FG 
than the multifeature motive. Those who disagreed with the statement ‘hawkers pay no tax’ 
are less likely to buy from vendors for SR and multifeature motives than the FG motive. 
Multifeature explanation (MF): Relative to singles, married people are less likely to buy 
products from street vendors on the basis of multifeature than the FG motive. Relative to the 
highest educational levels, individuals with intermediate-level educational attainment are less 
likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than SR and FG motives. Individuals who 
disagreed with the statements ‘hawkers are poor and disadvantaged’ and ‘hawkers pay 
multiple fees’ are less likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than FEF motives. 
Conversely, individuals who disagreed with the statement, ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’ 
are more likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than FG and FEF motives. 
Finally, we present in Table 5, a summary of the unique attributes of these motives. One may 
view the multifeature motive as a reflection of the other three motives since it leverages on 
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them. However, as discussed above results in Table 5 clearly show that multifeature has a 
unique identity. 
[Insert Table 5 here]
Further Discussion
Individuals who cite FEF as a motive for buying goods/services from street vendors are likely 
to be single and highly educated. The government’s failure to plan and solve traffic-
congestion problems (FEF) cause young professionals to patronise street vendors since 
vendors are available and accessible. For example, to avoid getting to work late, young 
professionals leave for work at least two hours early, and since they work Mondays to 
Fridays, they do not have time to shop at supermarkets. Thus, they patronise street vendors 
for their daily food (e.g., snacks, drinks) and non-food (e.g., mobile phones/data, hard-
/software) needs, as their only option (Hanafi, 2018; AFP, 2016). Confirming this 
relationship is their perception that, although street vendors are poor/disadvantaged and/or 
pay multiple fees, vending helps vendors escape poverty12.
Individuals who cite SR as a motive for buying from vendors are likely to have attained mid-
level education and are plausibly of the opinion that vendors pay tax. Contrasting Culiberg 
and Badge (2014), people who buy for SR motives do not patronise street vendors in Lagos, 
Nigeria to avoid/evade tax, but to build kinship. To speculate, the ‘be your brother’s keeper’ 
12 This assertion was confirmed when we re-ran the multiple logistic model with Agreed and 
Disagreed as dummy and redundant variables respectively. See appendix
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culture is strong in Nigeria. So, it is common practice for family members, religious/business 
associates to buy products from a vendor-member to show loyalty and maintain kinship, 
rather than to buy from outsiders/formal shops. 
Individuals who cite FG as a motive for buying from street vendors are likely to be married 
and to have the lowest levels of formal education. Results confirm the findings of Williams 
and Martinez-Perez (2014), that people with dependants buy from street vendors for the 
lower price (FG) motive (Basinski, 2009, reports similar results for married women). Results 
also support Meagher and Yunusa’s (1996) observation that working-class income affects the 
demand-side of Nigeria’s informal economy and Martinez et al.’s (2017) argument that 
people patronise vendors because they are poor and earn a low income, as the low level of 
educational attainment suggests those who patronise vendors for the FG motive are unlikely 
to have attained high-paying formal sector jobs – hence they earn low wages (Verick, 2006). 
With 44.3 per cent of Nigerians living in extreme poverty (WPC, 2018), respondents’ 
perceive vending to provide a poverty escape-route, although vendors are burdened with 
multiple fees. Thus, for married women, buying from street vendors represents an 
opportunity to save, and thus escape from poverty.
Individuals who participate in the demand-side of street vending for multifeature reasons are 
likely to be single and highly educated. As noted earlier, these individuals have dual 
objectives for patronising vendors: to buy and to sell. This is confirmed by their perception 
that vendors are poor/disadvantaged, pay multiple fees, but that vending enables them to 
escape poverty, as they do not pay tax13. These individuals can be MNE representatives who 
patronise street vendors to make them distributors (Neuwirth, 2011); or traders in their own 
right, who in the process of going about their business find the need to buy food/water or 
13 Results confirmed: see footnote 13; appendix
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other items from vendors. We reiterate our earlier thesis that multifeature participants suggest 
street vending is self-sustaining.
Conclusions
This study extends the street-vending literature by reporting four motives for which 
individuals engage on the demand-side of street vending: FEF, SR, FG and multifeature 
rationales. With over half (53.3%) of respondents, FEF (formal economy failures) is the main 
motive for patronising street vendors in Nigeria. This contrasts with Williams and Martinez-
Perez’s (2014) findings that seeking lower prices (FG: financial gains) is the highest-ranked 
single motive for buying from vendors; but it does support their argument of significant 
country/regional variation in the main motive for patronising vendors. For Lagos, our 
findings call into question the ban or criminalisation of street vending, since policy makers 
are largely responsible for the main trigger, FEF. As explained earlier, the government’s 
failure to address traffic congestions on Lagos roads and consequent loss of daily travelling-
time (FEF) underpins individuals/young professionals’ patronage of vendors in Lagos. 
Also reported are six variables relating to these motives: marital status, level of education and 
four perception variables. Married individuals with low levels of formal education attainment 
will likely patronise street vendors for FG reasons (lower price/to save), whilst single, highly 
educated individuals will likely patronise vendors for FEF reasons (accessible, available, 
convenient) and multifeature reasons (buy and sell). However, significant differences exist in 
the perception of individuals patronising street vendors for FG and multifeature motives, as 
explained earlier and confirmed by the results in Table 5. These results confirm Sookram and 
Watson’s (2008) findings that married people participate in the informal economy’s demand-
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side, but they contrast with Williams and Martinez-Perez’s (2014) findings that younger and 
older people buying from street vendors are motivated by lower prices and FEF respectively. 
Descriptive analysis shows differences in respondents’ gender and main job-/occupation-
type, but in support of Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah (2008), they are statistically non-
significant. However, it contrasts with the findings of Williams and Martinez-Perez, (2014) 
and Sookram and Watson (2008), who reported significant differences between men and 
women participating in the informal economy’s demand-side. 
The multiple factors reported in this study highlight the need for pragmatic policies to tackle 
street vending in Lagos, Nigeria. Such a one-size-fits-all and extreme policy as 
banning/criminalising vending represents a suboptimal and unstable equilibrium. Therefore, 
as has been recommended elsewhere (Basinski, 2009; Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah 2008; Cross 
2000), policy makers should ‘consult’ with, rather than ‘confront’, street vendors, 
accommodating and allowing them to co-exist with the formal sector. One way of doing this 
is to ensure an honest, open and continuous dialogue between policy makers, street vendors 
and their patrons. This is supported by our findings that over half of vendors’ patrons have 
cited FEF as their main-motive. 
Finally, policy makers should facilitate an environment that encourages all citizens to achieve 
their full-economic potential, and not criminalise those going about their legitimate business. 
This can be achieved by ensuring policy consistency, redefining or reclassifying what they 
recognise as ‘informal activity’ (Xue and Huang, 2015), by deregulating the sector to allow 
informal economy/street vending to exist as an ‘incubator’ for business start-ups (Cross, 
2000) or by creating a vending drive-through market. However policy makers approach this 
challenge, individuals participating in both the demand- and supply-side of vending should 
have the resources and opportunities to achieve their full economic potential. 
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To conclude, we hope this article stimulates further research, as we cannot claim it provides 
answers to all possible questions relating to the demand-side of street vending. To enhance 
generalisation, future studies may employ larger samples to reflect Lagos state and Nigeria’s 
population. Findings reported in this study were based on 160 responses, although this figure 
compares well with those used in the literature.14 Moreover, efforts were made to achieve 
high quantity/quality sample15. In addition, further studies into what social ties mean and how 
they relate to vending would be helpful. Finally, whilst we have tried to reduce bias16, we 
accept that it cannot fully be eliminated. We thus might have omitted from this study a 
proportion of street vending patrons with uncaptured diverse motives. Nevertheless, to 
conclude, we restate this paper’s contributions: it reports four motives for participating on the 
demand-side of street vending, including a new multifeature motive, which, are, in turn, 
explained by individuals’ marital status, level of education, and perceptions of street vending. 
Findings highlight the need for urban planners to embrace pragmatic policies in addressing 
these demand-side drivers of street vending and use of the urban space, rather than 
criminalising its actors. 
14 Sample employed by Iyenda (2005) and Huang et al., (2017) to study Kinshasa and China 
were 125 and 200 respondents respectively. Further, we found consistent responses to 
common questions answered by all 600-respondents in support of the literature that the 
Nigerian informal economy shares similarities with those of other West Africa countries 
(Meagher and Yunusa, 1996).
15 Although interviewees were generally suspicious that the state government sponsored the 
survey, research administrators made extra efforts to refute this, hence the success of 160 
correctly completed questionnaires.  
16 See methods section.
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Tables
Table 1. Reliability analysis
Number of variables Cronbach α
1 Reliability test for dichotomous variables 10 0.858
2 Reliability test for Likert-scale variables 10 0.712
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Table 2. Respondents’ demographics and some important descriptive statistics
Item % of Total (N=160)
Gender:  
Male 
Female 
51.3
48.8
Age: 
16-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-64
Mean: 32; Std. Deviation: 7.5; Mode, Median: 30
14.4
37.5
19.4
13.8
15.0
Education: 
Non (no formal education)
SSE (Senior School Education)
HND/OND /NCE*
BSc/Degree
12.5
40.6
25.6
21.3
Employment status:
Employed + run own-business
Private/government employee
Fully self-employed
Don't know
13.2
18.2
49.7
18.9
Main job/business activity: 
Home/pure service
Sales/trader
Professionals
41.3
36.4
22.4
Involved in supply-side street hawking by main 
job/business activity
Home/pure service
Sales/trader
Professionals
74.1
76.9
34.4
Note: *HND: Higher national diploma, OND: ordinary National Diploma, NCE: National 
Certificate in Education; N: total responses.
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Table 3. Respondents reasons for patronising street vendors in Nigeria
Motive: % of total
Social redistributive rationale (help hawkers, networking/win 
customers)
9.9
Financial gains (cheaper/better than shop, save expenses/less cost) 12.5
Multifeature (only job known/survival, get quick/reliable 
money/income, easy sales)
24.3
Formal economy (accessible, reliable, save time) 53.3
Note: total responses (N): 160; respondents cited words in parenthesis
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Table 4. Multinomial logistic model results: motives of street vending & attributes
Coefficient @ different reference categoriesAttributes Rationale
SR FG MF FEF
Gender: Female SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
-49.86(.99)
-50.7(.99)
-50.6(.99)
49.86(.995)
0
-.84(.42)
-0.7(.49)
50.7(.99)
0.8(.42)
0
.14(.87)
50(0.993)
-
39(0.996)
-0.14(.87)
0
Marital status: 
Married
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
38.1(.995)
36.2(.995)
35.4(.995)
-38.1(.995)
0
-1.85(.062)
-2.63(.013)
-36.2(.995)
1.85(.062)
0
-.77(.37)
-
35(0.995)
2.63(.013)
0.77(.37)
0
Education level: SSE 
& below
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
-16.9(.998)
-18.7(.000)a
-36.6(.99)
16.94(.995)
0
-16.8(.000)a
-19.6(.000)
35.1(.99)
18.2(.998)
0
-1.4(.36)
36(0.99)
19.6(.998)
1.43(.36)
0
Hawkers are poor, 
disadvantaged: 
(Disagreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
34.94(.99)
33.7(.99)
36.6(.99)
-34.9(.99)
0
-1.21(.36)
1.68(.198)
-33.7(.99)
1.2(.36)
0
2.89(.011)
-36(0.99)
-
1.68(.198)
-
2.89(.011)
0
Hawking helpful to 
hawkers: 
(Disagreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
-
18.35(.995)
-15.9(.996)
-19.1(.995)
18.3(.995)
0
2.4(.054)
-0.74(.56)
15.9(.996)
-2.4(.054)
0
-3.14(.004)
19(0.995)
0.74(.56)
3.14(.004)
0
Hawkers pay no tax: 
(Disagreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
20.1[.000]
0.54(.79)
-0.5(.79)
-20.1(.000)
0
-
19.59(.000)
-20.6[.000]
-0.5(.79)
19.6[.000]
0
-1.04(.257)
0.5(0.79)
20.6[.000]
1.04(.26)
0
Hawkers pay 
multiple fees: 
(Disagreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
-20.5(.998)
-2.57(.28)
.068(.72)
20.5(.998)
0
17.94(.998)
21.2(.998)
2.57(.28)
-17.9(.998)
0
3.25(.026)
-
0.68(0.72)
-
21.2(.998)
-
3.25(.026)
0
Government 
overregulates, 
disturbs hawkers: 
(Disagreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF
0
-65.2[.000]
-70.1[.000]
-49.87(.99)
65.2(.996)
0
-5.31[.005]
15.3(.999)
70.5(.995)
5.3[.000]
0
20.59(.998)
50(0.99)
-
15.3[.000]
-
20.6[.000]
0
Likelihood Ratio
Chi-Square 
Pseudo R-Square (Nalkerke):
75.8***
114.49***
0.80
Note: ***, **, & * means 1%, 5%, & 10% levels of significance; p-values in parenthesis; standard 
errors in [ ] parenthesis; a = educlevel(1); SSE: secondary school education; SR: social redistributive; 
FG: financial gains, MF: multifeature; FEF: formal economy failures
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Table 5. Difference between the rationale of street vending and their attributes
Formal 
Econom
y
Social 
Redistributi
ve
Financial 
Gains
Multifeatu
re
Marital status Single n.s. Married Single
Education level Top-
level
Mid-level Lowest 
level/none
Top-level
Perception 1: SH do not pay 
tax
Agreed Agreed n.s. Agreed 
Perception 2: SH pay 
multiple fees
Disagree
d
n.s. Agreed Agreed 
Perception 3: SH are poor, 
disadvantaged
Disagree
d
n.s. n.s. Agreed 
Perception 4: SHng helps 
vendors to escape poverty 
Agreed n.s. Agreed Agreed 
Note: SH: street vendors; SHng: street hawking; n.s.: statistically non-significant.
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Appendix
Table A shows results of the factors that further explain motives for street vending, with Agreed 
being the dummy, whilst Disagreed is redundant for perception variables 
Table A: multinomial logistic model results: rationale of street vending & attributes
Coefficient @ different reference categoriesAttributes Rational
e SR FG MF FEF
Marital status: 
Married
SR
FG
MF
FEF
-
1.68(.097)
-
2.05(.059)
1.68(.097) 2.05(.059)
Hawkers are poor, 
disadvantaged: 
(Agreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF -
3.48(.031)
-3.9(.004)
3.48(.031)
3.9(.004)
Hawking helpful to 
hawkers: (Agreed)
SR
FG
MF
FEF 3.69(.003)
-
3.69(.003)
Likelihood Ratio
Chi-Square 
Pseudo R-Square (Nalkerke):
68.97***
178.69***
0.81
Note: only statistically significant results are included; *** means 1% levels of significance; 
p-values in parenthesis; SSE: secondary school education; SR, FG. MF, FEF, as earlier defined.
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Extended appendix
NOTE: the following extended appendix has been added at the request of the referees to aid 
the review process. However, in order not to exceed the 8500-word limit, the author does not 
think it should be added to the final version of this paper, except if there is a way of publishing 
it as a separate document online. 
First, it is important to reiterate that the measures/variables analysed in this study were chosen 
on the basis of existing literature/theory. Specifically, H1-H3 were adopted from Williams and 
Martinez-Perez (2014), and H4-H7 were adopted from Sookram and Watson (2008), with 
Culiberg and Bajde (2014) also having a major influence on these choices. However, we still 
conducted the Cronbach test for additional comfort, with the results depicted in Tables EA1 
and EA2. The former depicts results for dichotomous variables; the latter for continuous 
variables. However, as the attached questionnaire shows, there are over 20 questions in total, 
with many seeking confirmation of an earlier question. It was designed this way to check if 
respondents were consistent in their responses.
Cronbach results:
Table EA1: Reliability analysis for dichotomous variables
Cronbach reliability coefficient (α) = 0.858
Variables Correlated item-
total correlation
Cronbach α if 
item deleted
Gender .04 .888
Marital status -.045 .894
Have you previously worked (or currently work) in the 
public service?
.639 .840
Are you employed on the basis of a written contract or 
agreement?
.636 .839
Does your employer pay contributions to the pension 
funds for you?
.872 .824
Do you benefit from paid annual leave or from 
compensation instead of it?
.849 .824
In case of incapacity to work due to health reasons, 
would you benefit from paid or sick leave?
.881 .822
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In case of birth of a child, would you be given the 
opportunity to benefit from maternity leave?
.872 .824
Unless it is a fault of yours, could you be dismissed by 
your employer without advance notice?
.783 .83
Has the ban on street hawking in Lagos affected you? .375 .861
 
Table EA2: Reliability analysis for likert-scale variables
Cronbach reliability coefficient (α) = 0.712
Variables Correlated item-
total correlation
Cronbach α if 
item deleted
Street hawkers are poor because they are disadvantaged .186 .736
Street hawking helps people that are poor to overcome 
poverty
.559 .658
Street hawkers do not pay tax#
Street hawkers pay multiple fees for tickets to operate .452 .675
Government disturbance & regulation of street hawkers 
is too much
.443 .679
Before they can operate, street hawkers are compelled to 
give bribe to some-law enforcement agents
.411 .684
It is very risky for government taskforce to finds people 
hawking
.205 .715
There is no government support for street 
hawkers/hawking
.327 .697
Government should support street hawking as it is 
helpful to Lagosians
.303 .700
Street hawkers sell/(render) essential goods/(services) .649 .637
Street hawkers provide convenient goods and services to 
customer
.270 .704
# - included based on theory & evidence from literature
EA3: Research questionnaire
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Research questionnaire: This research aims to find out about street hawkers and why people 
patronise (buy from) them.
YOUR CODE NUMBER:
To ensure your anonymity we do NOT ask for your name but encourage you to choose for 
yourself a CODE number. Please keep a record of it as part of your right to withdraw. Please 
answer the questions that follow truthfully as nobody will be able to identify you in any way 
from your answers.
Focus of the research: we would like you to complete this questionnaire if any of the 
following describes you/your business (please circle the one/s applicable to you):
1. I use services (e.g., electrical appliances and mobile phone repairs, shoe repairs, etc) 
provided by one-man or small businesses
2. I have bought (or would buy) a good or service from hawkers or one-man or small-
family businesses
3. I buy water, snacks (e.g., gala, groundnut), clothes, recharge cards, books, tapes/CDs 
etc from street hawkers or vendors under umbrella stand
4. I buy food from local restaurant, food joints, mama-put, street food-hawkers
Special Note: 
A. When I say rank your options, please indicate the order of importance of the options 
you have taken, starting from one (1) as the most important/strongest 
B. A street hawker – this is anybody that sells anything on the street, whether on 
wheelbarrow, on tray, in/by hands, in a car, using bicycles etc
Code number: 
Please specify your:
1 Age
2 Gender
3 Marital Status
4 State of origin
5 Religion
6 Please write what you do as main job/business
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7 Write what you do as second job/business (if applicable)
8 Why do you have a second job/activity? (if applicable)
9 What is your level of education?
10 Please tick the one that best describes your employment status (tick only one pls):
I work for government, but also have my business[ ] I work for a private company, but 
also have my business[ ] I only work for a private company[ ] I only work for government[  
] I am fully self-employed, run my business[  ]
11 What year did you start this work/business? Please specify………………..
12 What type of location do you usually carry out your work or business? (if more than one 
option applies, please rank as 1=mostly, followed by 2, 3 …)
No fixed location/on the street[ ] mobile-Car/bus[ ] office[ ] own home[ ] business 
premises[ ] construction site[ ] workshop[ ] factory[ ] shop/kiosk[ ] street stall[ ]  client’s 
home/workplace[ ] market/bazaar stall[ ]  footpath/street corner[ ]
13 How often do you receive income or salary or money from your main work? 
Daily[ ] Weekly[ ] bi-monthly[ ]   Monthly[  ] Anytime activity/job is done[  ]   Never[  ]
13A. Table: money earned - please fill only relevant column – day, week or month
On the average, how much: Per Day Naira Per Week Naira Per Month Naira
13a1 Total revenue earned
13a2 Total expenses
13a3 Total income earned
13a4 Total money saved
14. What proportion of your total income is earned from your main work? 
All (about 100%)[  ]   about 75%[  ]   about 50%[  ]     about 25%[  ]     none[  ] 
14B. What is the source of your other income? Specify (if applicable)……………………….
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Please tick Yes or No for each of questions 15-17
Yes No.
15 Has the ban on street hawking in Lagos affected you?
16 Have you ever been involved in street hawking (i.e., sell as street hawker)?
17 Have you ever bought anything from a street hawker?
18 Why did (do) you patronise street hawkers? ………………………………………………
19 Please list three bad things about street hawkers/hawking in Lagos 
a…………………………….b…………………………………c…………………………
20 Please list three good things about street hawkers/hawking: a……………………………….
  b………………………………………..… c……………………………………….………
Please tick Yes or No for each of questions 21-32
Yes No.
21 Do you work full time or run your business full time?
22 Is your job or business activity seasonal
23 Have you received any training on doing this job/running this business?
24 Have you previously worked (or currently work) in the public service?
25 Are you employed on the basis of a written contract or agreement?
26 Does your employer pay contributions to the pension funds for you?
27 Do you benefit from paid annual leave or from compensation instead of it?
28 In case of incapacity to work due to health reasons, would you benefit from paid 
or sick leave?
29 In case of birth of a child, would you be given the opportunity to benefit from 
maternity leave?
30 Unless it is a fault of yours, could you be dismissed by your employer without 
advance notice?
31 In case of dismissal, would you receive the benefits and compensation specified in 
the labour legislation?
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32 Do you belong to a professional body or labour union in your domain of work or 
business?
33 If you belong to a union/professional body, for which of these does the body help you? (if 
more than one option applies, please rank as 1=mostly, followed by 2, 3 …)
Training[ ] access to loans[ ]  linkages with government[ ] interactions with 
employees/employer[ ] professional advancement[  ] none[  ] not applicable[  ] other, 
specify……………………………………………………………….
Please find the key to the table below: SA = strongly agree; A = agree; N = neither agree nor 
disagree; D = disagree; SD = strongly disagree. Please the one that best represents your view
SA A N D SD
34 Street hawkers are poor because they are disadvantaged
35 Street hawking helps people that are poor to overcome poverty
36 If there are good jobs for people, street hawking would end
37 Government should discourage street hawking as it is harmful to the 
economy
38 Street hawkers do not pay tax
39 Street hawkers pay multiple fees for tickets to operate
40 Government disturbance & regulation of street hawkers is too much
41 Before they can operate, street hawkers are compelled to give bribe to 
some-law enforcement agents
42 It is very risky for government taskforce to finds people hawking
43 There is no government support for street hawkers/hawking
44 Government should support street hawking as it is helpful to Lagosians
45 Street hawkers sell/(render) essential goods/(services)
46 Street hawkers provide convenient goods and services to customer
47 Street hawkers provide unique and cheap goods and services
48 Despite ban on hawkers in Lagos, street hawking is still prevalent 
49 Street hawkers sell fake goods and services
50 Government’s policy to ban street hawking in Lagos is good
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51 What is the biggest challenge faced by street hawkers 
in Lagos
52 Which government agency or agents disturb 
(regulates) street hawkers? 
53 Please write two important contributions you think 
street hawkers/hawking make to Lagos economy 
1…………………………………………
2………………………………………..
54 Why do you think government has banned street 
hawkers/hawking in Lagos?
55 What next do you think government should do about 
street hawking/hawkers?
1…………………………………………
2………………………………………..
THANK YOU
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